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MARXIST AND CHRISTIAN HERMENEUTICS: 
A STUDY OF JAMESON'S 
THE POLITICAL UNCONSCIOUS* 
Clarence Walhout 
Frederic Jameson's The Political Unconscious attempts a comprehensive theory of her-
meneutics based on Marxist principles. Through a three-stage process of interpretation, 
which moves from text to society to philosophy of history, Jameson investigates a para-
digmatic model for textual analysis which will avoid relativistic ideological interpretations. 
The present article attempts to delineate the similarities and the critical differences between 
Jameson's model and a Christian model for hermeneutics. The discussion focuses on 
concepts of contradiction, finitude, and "discovery" as well as on Jamesonian views of 
utopia, mode of production, ethics, and "the political unconscious." 
Frederic Jameson's The Political Unconscious 1 aims not simply to offer a her-
meneutical theory which will compete with others and, if successful, assign them 
to "the ashcan of history" (10). It aims, rather, for a "totalizing" or comprehensive 
theory which will stand above and judge other theories, using what it can, 
rejecting what is misconceived. What is needed, Jameson says, is a "master 
code" which can sort out and subsume critical operations which are "apparently 
antagonistic and incommensurable." For him Marxism is that master code: Mar-
xist hermeneutics deals with other critical methods "not so much by repUdiating 
their findings as by arguing its ultimate philosophical and methodological priority 
over more specialized interpretive codes ... " (21). 
Before assessing Jameson's project, it will be useful to examine some of the 
ways in which he refines the Marxist perspective, beginning with his revival of 
the concept of allegory as a critical category. In his "Preface" Jameson writes: 
"Interpretation is here construed as an essentially allegorical act, which consists 
in rewriting a given text in terms of a particular interpretive master code" (10). 
Any interpret\ltion of a text which goes beyond a descriptive analysis of its 
internal operations is by definition an allegorical reading; allegorical interpreta-
tions are those which construe the text in the light of a "master code," which 
constitutes the "untranscendable horizon" of the text. For Jameson, thus, allegor-
ical reading is not secondary, relative, or "personal" but is the primary goal of 
*This study was prepared during my tenure as Fellow of the Calvin Center for Christian Scholarship, 
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interpretation. 
In reviving the term allegory Jameson both distances himself from formalism 
and relates Marxist theory to the pre-Cartesian tradition of allegorical interpreta-
tion, namely, the medieval tradition of the four hern1eneuticallevels. Jameson 
sees the medieval system as the construction of a "totalizing" system or "master 
narrative" (albeit an erroneously theological one) which preserves the "literality 
of the original texts," i.e., the littera, what the text intended, but also places 
the literal meaning in the framework of a larger hermeneutical system. In this 
system the Old Testament is understood in its literal-historical sense and also is 
"rewritten" at a properly allegorical level as the expression of Christian meanings 
(truths). Such an interpretive method avoids the charge of historicism on the one 
hand, since it recognizes both the particularity of the literal-historical meaning 
and the universality of the allegorical significance, and the charge of subjecti vism 
on the other hand, since it places the work of the individual exegete within the 
conceptual framework of a theory of history. That is to say, only those Old 
Testament interpretations which are compatible with the Christian story (the 
story of Christ) can claim one's attention. Although in Jameson's view the 
Christian story is invested with ideological meanings which must be understood 
in the light of a deeper story (the Marxist one), the allegorical method as such 
is fundamental for a comprehensive hermeneutical theory. 
Jameson summarizes his own conception of the hermeneutical task as follows: 
... in particular we will suggest that. .. semantic enrichment and enlarge-
ment of the inert givens and materials of a particular text must take 
place within three concentric frameworks, which mark a widening out 
of the sense of the social ground of a text through the notions, first, of 
political history, in the narrow sense of punctual event and a chronicle-
like sequence of happenings in time; then of society, in the now already 
less diachronic and timebound sense of a constitutive tension and struggle 
between social classes; and, ultimately, of history now conceived in its 
vastest sense of the sequence of modes of production and the succession 
and destiny of the various human social formations, from pre-historic 
life to whatever far future history has in store for us. (75) 
These three "frameworks" for literary understanding are interdependent and 
sequential. At the first level, when the interpreter analyzes the internal structures 
of a text, he sees that formal patterns are "a symbolic enactment of the social 
within the formal and the aesthetic" (77); that is to say, when an author invents 
or creates a formal structure, he does so in order to find solutions to "unresolvable 
social contradictions" (79). The first level of analysis reveals, therefore, that a 
text involves "the rewriting or restructuration of a prior historical or ideological 
subtext" (81); its particular textual form or structure is part of a "political history." 
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Thus, in its rewriting of the historical situation or subtext, the text is constituted 
as a "symbolic act." 
It is important at this first level of textual analysis to emphasize the importance 
of actual history or "reality" as the subtext. History or "reality" does not appear 
as such in the text, for history per se is "non-narrative and nonrepresentational" 
and "is inaccessible to us except in textual form" (82); insofar as we can know 
it, history is reconstructed "after the fact." Nevertheless, the subtext (actual 
history or "reality") exists as the material out of which the symbolic or formal 
structures are created. For Jameson the formalist or structuralist restriction of 
the reference of a text to its own immanent context fails to account for the real 
situation to which the text is a reaction or response. In his view the issues in 
the text originate in the contradictions of society even though the text rewrites 
or restructures the contradictions in terms of its own formal system. 
Because of this relationship of text to its subtext, the second level of analysis 
takes us outside the text to the social reality itself. Here the immediate social 
context of a work can be apprehended in terms of class relationships or class 
struggle. We need at this point only to note Jameson's strong emphasis on 
contradiction, or dichotomy, or antagonism, as the essential property of the class 
relationship. The principle of contradiction accounts for the processes of history 
and hence for the subsequent rise of texts. In the historical world "the dialogue 
of class struggle is one in which two opposing discourses fight it out within the 
general unity of a shared code" (84); in a text the structural patterns must be 
understood as a reaction to and transformation of prior social contradictions 
(class struggles). Thus, the dialectic of contradictions observable within the text 
must be grasped at the second level of analysis as a symbolic rewriting of 
contradictions outside the text. As Jameson puts it: "the individual text retains 
its formal structure as a symbolic act: yet the value and character of such symbolic 
action are now significantly modified and enlarged. On this rewriting, the indi-
vidual utterance or text is grasped as a symbolic move in an essentially polemic 
and strategic ideological confrontation between the classes ... " (85). 
But this second level of (social) analysis shows the need for a third level. Just 
as the codes which structure texts must be set in the larger framework of social 
struggles, so the codes which structure the class struggles of particular societies 
must be set in the larger framework of history. Just as we needed a "social" 
method for understanding the diversity of texts, so we now need a historical 
method for understanding the diversity of societies. Ultimately what is called 
for, Jameson says, is a philosophy of history. 
Jameson's strategy for discovering the historical patterns of social development 
is to show that the synchronic or formal structures of social life and the diachronic 
or temporal processes of social change are always mutually interdependent and 
interactive and that neither can fully explain the other. Social conflict arises 
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because several structures exist within a given society, and these structures exist 
because the changes that take place at the various levels of social activity proceed 
at varying tempos. Structural analysis can reveal the existence of differences 
(conflicting codes) in a society, but when we search for a deeper principle in 
terms of which we can understand social unity, we discover that the structures 
of a given society are formed out of the unresolved contradictions of its earlier 
stages and the new contradictions which arise in its later stages. Thus, the 
interpenetration of structure and process reveals that a deeper principle for under-
standing historical reality is needed. 
This principle is in Jameson's view "what the Marxian tradition designates as 
a mode of production" (89). For Jameson this concept is not the older Marxist 
concept of the economic infrastructure of a society; rather, it is a structural 
concept by which we can understand social change at all levels of social life: 
there are political, legal, artistic, and cultural modes of production as well as 
economic ones. Through the concept of mode of production we can interpret 
both the interrelationship of social actions within a society and the various forms 
of class conflict which appear in separate societies. Mode of production , in short, 
is a principle which enables us to interpret changing social patterns wherever 
they occur in the process of history. Social changes seen at the level of global 
history can be understood as cultural revolutions and can be distinguished from 
local revolutions within particular societies. Thus, the third level of hermeneutics 
places a text in the larger context of cultural revolution and historical change as 
these are understood in the light of the concept of mode of production. 
In treating mode of production in this way, Jameson broadens the traditional 
Marxist understanding of this concept as an exclusively economic one. Following 
structuralist Marxists like Althusser, Jameson blunts the charges of economic 
determinism and economic reductionism by asserting that while political, jurid-
ical, aesthetic, and other levels of social life may be influenced by economic 
forces, they also develop their own histories and internal dynamics. While 
economic modes of production are fundamental in the structures and ideologies 
of a society, they are not determinative in a simple causal sense. The forms of 
social life are mutually interactive in complex networks of causal relations. Thus, 
Jameson uses the term mode of production to account for these social and 
historical complexities while at the same time he does not altogether undermine 
its traditional associations with the concept of an economic infrastructure. 
Jameson's third hermeneutical level requires a theory of historical change; 
however, it also is the place at which such a theory must be developed. This is 
so because we must construct a philosophy of history from within history itself. At 
the first level the formal structure of a text is interpreted in the light of social 
contradictions, and at the second level the formal structure of a society is inter-
preted in the light of historical contradictions, but what can provide the basis 
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for interpreting the formal structure of historical contradictions? Only history 
itself, and thus Jameson writes that "with this final horizon ... we emerge into a 
space in which History itself becomes the ultimate ground as well as the untrans-
cendabIe limit of our understanding in general and our textual interpretations in 
particular" (100). 
For Jameson the final principle which enables us to understand history itself 
as the ultimate ground and the limit of our understanding is the political uncon-
scious. The modes of production which structure historical societies and bring 
about social change through a dialectic of contradiction are manifestations or 
instantiations of the political unconscious, the principle which gives structural 
form to history per se. It is important to understand that the political unconscious 
is a formal principle and does not exist as a social reality. But it is also the case 
that the political unconscious can be grasped and defined as a formal-structural 
principle only on the basis of its "effects" in actual history; that is to say, our 
understanding of history requires a universal structural principle, but that principle 
can only be arrived at or projected on the basis ofthe analysis of history itself. 
Here a key problem arises. The moment of historical understanding is "also 
the moment in which the whole problem of interpretive priorities returns with a 
vengeance, and in which the practitioners of alternate or rival interpretive 
codes ... will again assert 'History' as simply one more code among others, with 
no particularly privileged status" (100). Can we regard the political unconscious 
as anything more than one concept among many for our understanding of the 
nature of history? In addressing the problem Jameson refuses the ploy, common 
in our day, "of opposing one reified theme--History--by another--language--in 
a polemic debate as to the ultimate priority of one over the other" (100). Instead, 
he offers some reflections on historiography as indicative of how it is possible 
to conceive of History as an ultimate "ground and as an absent cause." 
Historians, he observes, come to differing interpretations of historical data, 
but all of them conceive of their interpretations as restructurations of the raw 
data of history , ofthe "inert material" which is the way things happened. Historical 
interpretations, he suggests, aim to understand why what happened had to happen 
the way it did. This observation suggests that history is perceived under the form 
of Necessity. The fact that historians interpret historical events or historical 
causation in various ways indicates not that the idea of Necessity is in question 
but rather that causal explanations are both difficult to pin down and inadequate 
for the understanding of historical change. Though causal explanations represent 
a significant method of historiography, Jameson argues, we need as well a 
method of structural analysis and finally a philosophy of history. At this final 
level "the most powerful realizations of a Marxist historiography ... remain visions 
of historical Necessity .. .in the form of the inexorable logic in the determinate 
failure of all the revolutions that have taken place in human history ... " (101-02). 
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History, then, "is the experience of Necessity" as the inexorable form of events" 
(102). History must be conceived as the working out of the political unconscious 
as it gives structural coherence, through the social modes of production, to an 
"inevitable" process of dialectical contradiction and cultural revolution leading 
to the ultimate goal of history. This goal is the resolution of contradictions in 
the classless and non-ideological society; the aim is "to wrest a realm of Freedom 
from a realm of Necessity" (19). Through the contradictions of social life we 
move in the processes of history toward that integration of life demanded by the 
political unconscious as the unifying principle of all human existence. At such 
a point of integration, human freedom becomes one with historical necessity. 
The political unconscious, thus, is for Jameson that universal principle which 
is necessary if we are to conceive of the unity of history and thereby understand 
the formal preconditions for social life. Just as grammar establishes the "neces-
sary" preconditions for language even though the concept grammar does not 
predetermine the shape or reality of any particular language, so the political 
unconscious establishes the "necessary" precondition for social realities though 
the concept political unconscious does not predetermine the shape or reality of 
any particular society. Just as the concept grammar is necessary for our under-
standing of the grammatical systems or codes which give order to our discourse, 
so the concept political unconscious is necessary for our understanding of modes 
of production as the systematizing code which orders social life. And just as a 
grammatical paradigm or code is necessary for our analysis of the particular 
syntactic relationships in an actual language, so mode of production as a social 
paradigm or eode is necessary for our analysis of particular forms of social life. 
We discover, thus, a conceptual necessity-a set of interrelated conceptual prin-
ciples-as we formulate the concepts which enable us to interpret social realities. 
The necessity which characterizes our conceptual understanding of history does 
not entail actual historical or social determinism, but it does enable us to construct 
a paradigmatic "master code" which establishes the necessary preconditions for 
interpretation. 
We may now draw to a conclusion this exposition of Jameson's theory by 
noting two ideas which will be discussed at greater length in the following 
sections. First, Jameson insists that moral categories be understood as ideological 
and not as absolute norms for understanding and interpretation. The political 
unconscious is itself neither good nor evil-it is "beyond good and evil"; good 
and evil are concepts which arise in the processes of history and are defined in 
the dialectic of social conflict. Secondly, the Marxist conception of Utopia plays 
an important part in Jameson's theory because for Jameson, as for all Marxist 
theorists, the concept of Utopia functions as the theoretical end-point of history 
and helps to explain the teleological structure of social change. 
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II 
In this section we will examine certain parallels which can be found in Marxist 
and Christian hermeneutics. Christian literary critics from Eliot to Tate to C. S. 
Lewis have been enticed by twentieth-century formalism, and it is somewhat 
ironic that a Marxist reminds Christian theorists of their own long-standing 
traditions. But it is not primarily Jameson's recognition of medieval hermeneutics 
that reveals certain affinities between Marxist and Christian theorizing; it is rather 
the recovery of history as a fundamental category in textual study. Jameson's 
critique of structuralism sounds a sympathetic note in Christian ears, for the 
Christian theorist also sees history as the arena in which the human prospect is 
to be understood. Neither Marxism nor Christianity rejects formal or synchronic 
analysis, but they both reject the tendency of formalism to reduce meanings to 
the structures of language and the fonns of discourse. Christian theorists may 
be walking in opposite directions from Jameson, as well as from Derrida and 
others, but they are walking on the same side of the fence. 
Another similarity between Christian and Marxist theories can be seen in the 
parallel between the Marxist concept of Utopia and the Christian concept of the 
Eschaton. Although the description of what the eschatological society comes 
to-the classless society or the city of God-may reveal profound differences, 
both theories emphasize teleology. If a philosophy of history is what is needed 
as the final level of hermeneutical understanding, then the concern with direction, 
purpose, ends, is as necessary as the concern with origins, causes, and the 
dynamics of change. Because of his own historical and social concerns Jameson 
can see keenly the importance of the fourth (anagogical) level in the medieval-
Christian hermeneutic. 
A third similarity can be seen through Jameson's definition of what constitutes 
allegorical readings of texts. If allegory is not just a genre but a method, then 
clearly the Christian tradition of allegorized readings is simply a recognition that 
any hermeneutical theory necessarily interprets texts in the light of a prior theory 
of textuality. Since interpretation involves more than formal analysis of textual 
material, complete interpretations are by definition allegorical as well as descrip-
tive. Jameson's clarification of this point helps to rescue the medieval-Christian 
method from its contemporary status as a hopelessly outdated prejUdice. Not 
even the Christian theorist wants to go back to medieval hermeneutical practices, 
however. The point is simply that in clarifying the inner logic of the medieval 
system Jameson helps to clarify both Marxist and Christian hermeneutical theory. 
A fourth similarity is brought out in Jameson's response to the view that 
Marxism represents another religion. He writes, " .. .I have throughout the present 
work implied what I have suggested explicitly elsewhere, that any comparison 
of Marxism with religion is a two-way street, in which the former is not necessarily 
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discredited by its association with the latter" (258). Although Jameson considers 
Christian teachings to be ideological, his recognition of the analogy between 
Marxist theory and the conceptual framework of religious thought helps to clear 
the air for rational debate. Because religion is so often suspect in contemporary 
academic discussions, Christian theorizing is sometimes thought to be either 
impossible or misguided in a priori ways. Such is the plight of Marxism, too, 
in many places (in America at least); but the recognition of the "totalizing" 
demands of religion should not by definition be suspect, for they are the demands 
of any comprehensive theory. 
In this context it is appropriate to examine what Jameson sees as the "reduc-
tionist tendencies" of Christian theory. Any Christian theorist will admit that in 
the history of his tradition can be found methods and practices which are reduc-
tionistic (just as Jameson acknowledges local ideologies within the history of 
Marxist theorizing), but the issue of Christian reductionism is not that simple. 
Any comprehensive or "totalizing" theory of interpretation will see other theories 
as limited and therefore reductionistic. Thus, from his point of view Jameson is 
correct in considering Christian theory (or any theory but the Marxist one) as 
reductionistic. But a Christian theory (insofar as it is purged of its local miscon-
ceptions) also claims comprehensiveness and will view Marxist and other theories 
as reductionistic. There is, then, this additional similarity between Jameson's 
theory and a Christian theory, namely that both see the need for a comprehensive 
philosophy as the ultimate level of interpretive theory and thus view others as 
reductionistic. Whether it is Christianity that is reductionistic or Marxism that 
is reductionistic is a matter for debate. 
Other points of similarity could no doubt be discerned, but these will suffice 
to suggest that the methodological aims of Marxist and Christian theorizing are 
remarkably (and surprisingly) similar. Such recognition may pave the way for 
more fruitful debate of the substantive differences. 
III 
In the following sections we will offer a critique of Jameson's theory, beginning 
with his privileging of the concept of contradiction. Since the scope of the essay 
will not allow for full analysis, the aim will be to raise questions that will once 
again problematize certain of Jameson's theses. If nothing more, the discussion 
will help to sharpen the issues which divide Marxist and Christian theories. 
I want to suggest that the key to Jameson's theory is the principle of contradic-
tion and that other concepts such as the concept of Utopia, the ideological nature 
of ethics, and the political unconscious itself become problematic if the principle 
of contradiction is made to waver. Jameson himself asserts the centrality of 
contradiction to his theory: 
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We have implied that in order to be consequent, the will to read literacy 
or cultural texts as symbolic acts must necessarily grasp them as resol-
utions of determinate contradictions; and it is clear that the notion of 
contradiction is central to any Marxist cultural analysis, just as it will 
remain central in our two subsequent horizons, although it will there 
take rather different forms. (80) 
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The discovery of contradiction at both textual and social levels is the mark of 
the completeness of an analysis: 
Here again, then, at the level of social analysis the requirement to 
prolong interpretation to the point at which this ultimate contradiction 
begins to appear offers a criterion for the completeness or insufficiency 
of the analysis. 
At the third level of analysis, too, contradiction is the key: 
Furthermore, just as in our discussion of the first two we have stressed 
the centrality of the category of contradiction for any Marxist 
analysis ... so too here we can effectively validate the horizon of the 
mode of production by showing the form contradiction takes on this 
level, and the relationship of the cultural object to it. (94) 
The importance of contradiction for Marxist theory is that without it there would 
be no way of accounting for social change; without it there would be no history. 
Let us examine this concept first as a methodological strategy of formal analysis 
and secondly as a principle of social dialectic. 
The former can be treated briefly with the help ofT. K. Seung's Structuralism 
and Hermeneutics. 2 Seung demonstrates that methodological confusion can arise 
from a failure to distinguish between binary opposition and binary distinction, 
or, in logical discourse, between "contrariety" and "contradiction," or, in Kantian 
terms, between real and logical oppositions: 
Although these two principles look alike, they are quite different. Binary 
distinction is the simplest logical device for discrimination, namely, 
between having a quality or attribute and not having it, or between 
belonging to a class or not belonging to it. It underlies every assertion 
or denial. There can be no more pervasive logical principle than this 
one. But the principle of binary opposition does not have the same 
universal scope as the principle of binary distinction ... (lO-ll). 
Binary distinction can be expressed by using two symbols: a positive 
term and the negation sign, e.g., A and -A. Binary opposition, however, 
requires three symbols: two positive and their relation ... Binary distinc-
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tion requires no relational term, because the relation between a positive 
term and its negation is established by the negation itself. Even when 
one of the two terms in a bipolar opposition stands for the privation of 
what is represented by the other term (e.g., light and darkness), both 
terms function as positive terms (i.e., darkness is not defined as non-
light), insofar as this opposition is accepted as binary. (11-12) 
Seung shows that structural analysis of texts makes use of the category of binary 
opposition and not of binary distinction and that a failure to keep this distinction 
clear can result in the confusion of logical and historical methods. Insofar as we 
are concerned with interpreting texts as historical documents, the distinction 
between contradiction as a logical category and opposition as a historical category 
is crucial for the nature and validity of the analysis. Since structural analysis of 
texts, however, is concerned with binary opposition (not logical contradiction), 
Seung's book serves here as a reminder that in such analysis we always need a 
third term or category to indicate or "explain" the relation of the two temlS of 
the binary opposition. 
If there is reason to be cautious concerning the principle of contradiction as 
a tool in formal or synchronic analysis of texts, there is even more reason to be 
cautious at the level of historical or diachronic interpretation, for if one treats 
historical conflicts as if they were logical contradictions, he is likely to claim 
for a historical theory greater validity than it merits. The relations between 
temporal events can only be understood by empirical analysis or by a theory 
which is grounded in empirical analysis. Once a theory is formed, of course, it 
is subject to logical testing and development, but a historical theory (i.e., a 
theory about historical events) can never escape its empirical roots. 
The significance of this observation for Jameson's theory can be seen when 
we examine the ground for his view that contradiction is the key principle at all 
three levels of hermeneutical analysis. In the case of the first level we can argue 
diachronically that textual "contradictions" arise because of prior social "con-
tradictions" which are subsequently transformed by the symbolic action of the 
text. And we can argue that at the second level social conflicts arise because of 
the interactions of the various levels of social life. But how do we explain at 
the third level the existence of contradictions as a condition of the historical 
process itself? If historical contradictions, i.e., actual conflicts in the course of 
history, arise, what is the diachronic, causal explanations of such contradictions? 
There can be !10 direct evidence in answer to this question because we cannot 
get beyond the contradictions of history to some prior, non-historical state of 
affairs. Yet the theory that history must be explained by the principle of contradic-
tion has no independent logical status either. We can "explain" the existence of 
contradiction at the third level of analysis only by an appeal to our experience 
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of and reflection on history itself; a philosophy of history must arise from within 
history. This, unfortunately, is the case with all historical theories: all are formu-
lated on the basis of empirical evidence and are subject to empirical testing; 
none has privileged status on the basis of formal logic alone. 
That the principle of contradiction as Jameson uses the term could not be the 
principle of logical contradiction is evident from the fact that logical contradiction 
is concerned with the formal relation of propositions within a given structural 
framework and requires a prior definition of the appropriate framework. This 
requirement cannot be met in the case of a philosophy of history since there is 
no standpoint outside of history from which history can be defined. It is clear, 
therefore, (as it would be also from an analysis of Jameson's usage of the word) 
that for Jameson the term contradiction has reference to the actual processes of 
history and is derived from the observation and theorizing about historical experi-
ence. Now if the term contradiction does not function in Jameson as it does in 
the context of a purely formal logic, then we can better understand what Jameson 
is speaking of at his third level by replacing contradiction with the term opposition 
in the sense that Seung indicates above. Historical "contradictions" are really 
historical "oppositions". 
If contradiction is glossed as opposition. then, as Seung shows, a third term 
is needed to understand the opposing terms of the opposition. And when we 
translate this requirement from a formal-synchronic analysis into a historical-diac-
hronic analysis we see that a temporal unity must be prior to a temporal opposition. 
Just as in synchronic analysis we need a conceptual unity in terms of which to 
identify and "explain" structural oppositions, so in diachronic analysis we need 
an actual social unity to identify and account for actual historical oppositions; 
the two terms of the social opposition must be seen as the division of a prior unity. 
We are now able to see that Jameson's philosophy of history includes an 
ontology of history. Since the concept of contradiction arises out of the experience 
and reflection on history and is a principle that is instantiated in the processes 
of history, it constitutes an account of how history works, a description of how 
and why historical events occur. Contradiction is, thus, for Jameson a property 
of historical reality and not a purely formal or logical category. To put it in 
another way, if Jameson's philosophy of history is to have semantic and her-
meneutical force and not merely logical or formal cogency, it must say something 
about history and not just about the formal relations of logical categories. But 
in that case it attributes meanings to history, meanings which are inherent in 
historical experience. As a theory of the meaning of history and as a hermeneutical 
theory for the interpretation of historical meaning, Jameson's philosophy.of 
history is also an ontology of history, i.e., a theory about the nature and reality 
of history. 
On the basis of what has been said so far, there is, of course, no need to 
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abandon the theory, since we are speaking only of the grounds of the theory and 
not the cogency of the theory itself. All theories of history are subject to the 
conditions we have been discussing, and Jameson's so far reveals no peculiar 
weakness. Our aim up to this point has been only to show first, that the term 
contradiction as Jameson uses it is a descriptive and diachronic concept rather 
than a purely formal and logical one and, second, that as a consequence his 
philosophy of history contains within it an ontological description of historical 
reality. 
The Marxist ontology can be understood further when we seek to understand 
why Jameson considers the principle of contradiction crucial for the third level 
of analysis as well as for the first and second. Let us phrase the question this 
way: Why is the principle of contradiction a necessary and originary condition 
of historical change? The answer is that on Marxist grounds the principle of 
contradiction is necessary because social-historical reality is all that there is. If 
there is no reality but social (i.e., material) reality, then the principle of contradic-
tion must be already inherent in social reality as its necessary condition for being 
historical. If change is brought about by contradiction, then contradiction is the 
precondition of history. Thus, the principle of contradiction is important because 
it functions also as an ontological description of the nature and boundary of what 
is real. 
IV 
The foregoing observations will help us to make further analyses of Marxist 
and Christian hermeneutical theories, for in spite of their methodological 
similarities Marxism and Christianity differ profoundly on ontological questions. 
A Christian ontology is obviously antithetical to the Marxist one, for Christianity 
posits the existence of a transcendent, transhistorical reality to which social-his-
torical reality holds a fundamental relation of dependence. Ontologically Marxism 
and Christianity are worlds apart. 
Let us examine some of the consequences of Marxist and Christian ontologies 
for a philosophy of history and for a theory of social change. First of all, in 
Christian theory the principle of contradiction is not primary but secondary, not 
necessary but contingent, not ontologically prior. Even if contradiction (oppos-
ition) were (and it probably is) a necessary category for the interpretation of 
actual social change, it, like history itself, is contingent upon the prior relation 
of the historic'll to the transhistorical. And Christianity asserts, of course, that 
a fundamental unity is prior to all contradiction (opposition). 
Theologically this unity is asserted in the Christian doctrine of creation, which 
requires here a word of explanation. It might appear that the doctrine of creation 
itself presupposes contradiction because of the ontological gulf between the 
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Creator and the created. This, however, is only apparently the case, for the 
principle of contradiction requires that opposition occur at the same level of 
reality or within the same ontological category. For Jameson contradiction is 
primary because social reality is all that there is, but the Christian view of 
creation posits two orders of reality such that the principle of contradiction 
(opposition) need not occur. Difference is not equivalent to contradiction or 
structural opposition. While there are differences between Creator and created, 
the relation between them is not and need not be defined as contradiction. The 
Christian conception of this relation is better indicated by the term finitude, 
which means that created reality (the historical-social world) stands in the relation 
of the contingent to the necessary, of limitation to fullness, of the finite to the 
infinite. In the Christian view, it is finitude rather than contradiction that charac-
terizes the historical-social world at the deepest ontological level. 
The difference between Christian and Marxist thought on this point may also 
be seen in their respective concepts of the original unified society. For Marxists 
the notion of an original unified society is a hypothetical construct which we 
can recognize as the theoretical demand for a social unity which precedes social 
contradiction. When Marxist theorists speak of a "precIa~s society" (290) whose 
unity was necessarily destroyed by the material need to produce goods for sur-
vival, it seems apparent that such a society is based as much on theoretical 
grounds as on empirical ones. The concept of "primitive communism" is necessary 
in order to make the Marxist theory of social "contradiction" (opposition) a 
coherent one. But as we have seen, the concept of an original unitary society is 
dubious on theoretical grounds, for there is no basis outside of history itself for 
a concept of contradiction as the necessary principle which operates within 
history. Two dilemmas result. First, if social-material reality is all there is and 
the principle of contradiction is the mark of all societies, why should there be 
an exception? Second, if the principle of contradiction is a pre-condition for 
historical change, why would the original society change, or, more strongly, 
could it change if the principle of contradiction were not already contained within 
it? But in that case it would not be the unified society that is envisioned by most 
Marxists. Even if one conceives of this society as a theoretical or hypothetical 
one, the logical problems remain. Indeed, on Marxist grounds only if one could 
in fact demonstrate the actual existence of such a society could one strengthen 
the position, but that seems to be both theoretically and empirically dubious.' 
Christian theory, too, posits the concept of a unified original "society" (even 
though in the narrative record of that society it consists of only two persons), 
and so the problem being discussed holds there, too. However, the Christian 
theory avoids the logical problems which occur when Marxists make the principle 
of contradiction the primary one. For Christian theory as well as for Marxist 
theory the contradictions (oppositions) in social life require (diachronically or 
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historically) a prior unified society, but in the Christian case the form of that 
society is explained by the principle of finitude rather than the principle of 
contradiction. 
We may now examine a bit further some of the implications of the term 
finitude. In the Christian view the Creator embodies the fullness of being and 
meaning in a way that cannot be shared completely with the creation, hence the 
ontological difference between Creator and created. Yet man is made "in the 
image of God," that is, the meaning which men desire and search for is what 
is embodied in its fullness in God. This is Christian doctrine, of course, but we 
should not ignore its intuitive attractiveness; that is to say, our intuitive sense 
that we can search for richer meanings than we already have suggests that we 
can also conceive of a meaning which is more than we have and to which we 
aspire. In any case, this is what is implied in the termfinitude. Man's existence 
is finite and dependent, but he stands in relation to a reality which transcends 
him as the fullness of being and meaning. 
If finitude is a more basic category for social (i.e., human) existence than 
contradiction, then perhaps an alternate theory of social change could be 
suggested by the term discovery. I do not claim to have an adequate explanation 
of this term and propose it only as a way of revealing the problem of using 
contradiction as the key to understanding social change. Let us pursue this option 
by the use of a specific example. Suppose that I walk into a hotel and discover 
that the lobby walls are blue. Does that "discovery" depend on the principle of 
contradiction? What appears immediately is that the term discovery can be under-
stood in two ways. First, to discover often means "to make a judgment about": 
to discover that the walls are blue means to make the judgment that the walls 
are blue. Discovery in this sense is a cognitive activity. But, secondly, to discover 
may mean simply "to experience": to discover that the walls are blue means 
simply to have the experience of "seeing blue." Discovery in this sense is an 
observational or sensuous activity. 
Now it appears to be the case that in order to make the judgment that the walls 
are blue I must have a prior awareness of the contradiction blue:not-blue and of 
distinctions between blue and other colors. Judgments about experience-in 
particular, judgments about new experiences in a changing world-appear to 
require an awareness of oppositions which is temporally as well as logically 
prior to the forming of the judgments. If I had no temporally prior conception 
of blue as distinguished from not-blue or as distinguished from other colors, I 
would not be able to form the judgment that the lobby walls are blue. 
But do these requirements hold for discovery in the second sense, namely, in 
the sense of having an experience of the wall's blueness? In order to judge or 
know that the hotel lobby is blue, I may have to think in categories that exhibit 
structural or logical opposition, but do I have to know the blueness of the lobby 
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in order to experience it? It seems unlikely. Suppose that I was brought up in 
isolation and had no language. If I were then suddenly placed in our hotel lobby , 
would I recognize the blueness of the walls? Surely I would not be able to 
describe them as blue, but it seems equally certain that I would have the experience 
of "seeing blue" even though I could not name the color or even think in terms 
of color. It seems that at the level of the senses I have experiences which are 
not dependent upon prior awareness of contradictions. Prior awareness of struc-
tural oppositions seems to be necessary if we are to make judgments, but what 
if I make no judgments and have no language to make them? Could it be that 
awareness of structural oppositions is a temporal precondition for our reflection 
on experience but not for our non-cognitive experience per se? 
Furthermore, it would appear that my non-verbalized experience of the hotel 
lobby is not a simple experience of blueness as a discrete phenomenon. It would 
be inescapably intertwined with other sensations such as the intensity of the 
light, the density of the walls and floor, the presence of other objects in the 
room, the spatial properties of the lobby, etc. If sensations, in short, are not 
simple but complex experiences, then the structural oppositions must be equally 
complex, such that a structural analysis of the whole universe (or virtually all 
of it) must be a prior condition for the single judgment that the lobby walls are 
blue. But it seems counter-intuitive to say that these oppositions must be tempor-
ally prior in my consciousness in order for me to have the sensation of seeing 
the blueness of the lobby walls. 
One could argue, however, that while cognitive awareness of numerous and 
complex structural oppositions is not temporally prior to the single experience 
of "seeing blue," yet our cognitive awareness of these oppositions is grounded 
in the actual existence of such oppositions in reality. Were it not for the existential 
or ontological reality of there being blue and other colors, there would be no 
analogous or parallel conceptual opposition; in short, if there were no blue and 
not-blue things, there would be no concepts blue and not-blue. Structuraloppos-
itions, it could be argued, are based on ontological oppositions. And if such is 
the case, then the existence of oppositions in reality make possible the experience 
of new things as things which are distinguishable from other things. Is contradic-
tion or opposition, in short, the condition of experience as well as of cognition? 
If contradiction or opposition is a condition for there being blue and not-blue 
things as well as the condition for our awareness of blue and not-blue as conceptual 
categories, is not contradiction the fundamental principle underlying both experi-
ence and thought? 
And if it is argued that structural or conceptual oppositions are counterparts 
of oppositions that exist in reality, then it could also be argued that ontological 
oppositions are prior to experience just as logical oppositions are prior to our 
judgments about experience. The principle of contradiction or opposition, it 
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would then appear, is both conceptually and onto logically prior to our experience 
of the world and our forn1ing of judgments about our experience. In that case 
it would appear that contradiction is fundamental to diachronic as well as to 
synchronic analysis; contradiction would seem to be temporally (diachronically) 
prior in our experience of the world as well as logically (synchronically) prior 
in our thinking about the world. 
But is there any reason to attribute the preconditions of thought (contradiction 
opposition) to reality per se? Is opposition an ontological principle as well as 
an epistemological principle? The logical (analytic) contradiction ofblue:not-blue 
and the structural (synthetic) opposition of blue vs. all other colors are conceptual 
constructs. But they are not therefore ontological realities. There is no opposition 
between blue and other colors in reality even though in our conceptual processes 
of identification, definition, and classification we do employ a logical structure 
based on contradiction and opposition. Blue things exist in reality alongside 
green and red things, but there is no opposition between them in the sense that 
there is a principle of opposition which functions in our conceptual distinctions 
between blue, green, and red. Differences among things ontologically is not 
equivalent to oppositions among things conceptually. 
If they are not equivalent, then it does not appear that contradiction (opposition) 
serves as a principle of diachronic explanation in the same way it serves as a 
principle of synchronic analysis. Contradiction is not temporally prior in experi-
ence in the same sense that contradiction is logically prior in conceptualization. 
The matters we are touching on are complex-involving complicated questions 
in the psychology of sensation, the psychology of learning, a philosophy of 
knowing, a philosophy of pre-cognitive states, etc.-but it perhaps could be 
suggested here that one has reason to be sceptical that a theory of the primacy 
of contradiction could serve as the basis for a diachronic theory of historical 
experience. Synchronic theories founded on the principle of contradiction (or 
opposition) may be an integral part of reflection or diachronic analyses, but it 
appears that the sources and processes of actual experience cannot be subsumed 
by synchronic analysis or any theory which makes contradiction a primary cat-
egory. For these reasons the term discovery-ill-defined as it is-may serve as 
a preferable reference point. Perhaps experiences are presented to consciousness 
in holistic ways prior to the discovery of contradictions or oppositions. If so, 
the concept of finitude could provide a theory as to why this is the case. Perhaps 
the finite self is motivated not only by a need to solve personal and social 
contradictions but also by a need to reach out toward that fullness of being which 
is already before him as the teleological goal of his existence. Perhaps man does 
not shape and define himself by means of the historical dialectic of contradiction; 
perhaps he strives to discover and fulfill a human nature which has already been 
defined and established as his proper goal. 
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It is worth observing that in Christian theory the concept of finitude allows 
for errors in judgment and for misunderstanding. If history is discovery and 
exploratioH, it does not preclude the possibility of error. This would be the case 
even irt the Edenic society, for finitude implies that the fullness of meaning is 
not yet realized but must be discovered. And, hence, it allows, too, for differences 
in social structures and cultural practices: societies can discover different things 
or be in error in different ways. "Contradictions" in the sense of social differences 
and oppositions are a normal part of historical life, and they would be even, in 
the Christian sense, in the prelapsarian society. 
What emerges from this discussion is that Jameson's theory equivocates on 
the term contradiction because he uses it to cover at least three distinct 
phenomena. First, it is used to designate the structural form of texts and societies. 
Secondly, the term is used to designate the structural form of history, but, as 
we have seen, the analysis leading to this conclusion is different from the analysis 
of structural oppositions at the first two levels since there is no larger frame of 
reference from which history can be seen. But in a third sense, the term contradic-
tion is also used to refer to actual social contlicts (class struggles, oppression, 
etc.) which are real and not just formal. This third use is distinct from the 
previous two because it has a diachronic function rather than a synchronic one. 
It is the failure to distinguish clearly the diachronic uses of the term contradiction 
that leads to the problems discussed above. 
v 
The foregoing discussion will enable us, at the risk of oversimplifying, to 
touch on several other topics with the intent simply of highlighting significant 
differences in Marxist and Christian thoughts as they relate to Jameson's her-
meneutical theories. The first of these is Jameson's discussion of ethics and the 
social categories of good and evil. Jameson's position is that good and evil are 
ideological concepts that have arisen historically and have been defined in various 
ways in the evolving processes of social dialectic: 
In its narrowest sense, ethical thought projects as permanent features 
of human 'experience,' and thus as a kind of 'wisdom' about personal 
life and interpersonal relations, what are in reality the historical and 
institutional specifics of a determinate type of group solidarity or class 
cohesion. (59) 
Or again Jameson writes: " ... we have forgotten the thrust of Nietzsche's thought 
and lost everything scandalous and virulent about it if we cannot understand how 
it is ethics itself which is the ideological vehicle and the legitimation of concrete 
structures of power and domination" (114). The theoretical need for Jameson's 
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thesis about ethics is clear in the light of our previous discussion of the concept 
of contradictions. If a principle of unity (such as the political unconscious) is 
required for a philosophy of history, then all oppositions, conflicts, or contradic-
tions are subsequent and historical, that is to say, ideological. And the opposition 
of good and evil must be taken as one of these ideological "contradictions." 
Jameson thus moves "beyond good and evil" to the non-ethical concept of the 
political unconscious. 
But here a problem of language use arises. Terms like class struggle, oppres-
sion, exploitation, and the like are employed not only as social but also as moral 
categories. It is hard to imagine that Jameson would say that the oppression of 
a working class in a capitalist society is ethically neutral and that it is neither 
good nor bad whether, in the class struggle, one side wins or loses. But if it is 
true that Marxists' judgments about the oppressed classes are moral ones and 
not ethically neutral, then the ethical standard of judgment cannot be taken as 
merely historical or ideological, unless Marxists are willing to say that all of 
their own judgments are ideological ones. Clearly not only do Marxists not say 
this, but it would be incoherent to do so. To speak of class struggle, exploitation, 
and the like implies in the Marxist "language game" a standard of moral judgment 
which is not itself historically relative or ideological. 4 Jameson's analysis has 
descriptive cogency insofar as it shows how moral categories have been variously 
understood and used in the history of social ethics, but insofar as he claims 
validity for the principles of Marxist social analysis, his judgments belie his 
claim to move theoretically beyond the categories of good and evil. It is hard 
to see how the concept of the political unconscious moves "beyond good and 
evil" if Marxist social ideals are accepted as the proper ideals of social life. 
Regardless of how good and evil are defined in Marxist social theory, the concrete 
goals of social life seem to imply normative ideals which are not wholly "beyond 
good and evil." 
On this point Christian theory deals with the problem by identifying the neces-
sary unifying principle for a philosophy of history with the good. What is beyond 
"good-and-evil," that is, what is beyond the social dialectic of good and evil, 
is the good. In the Christian view evil is contingent and is capable of being 
defined only in relationship to the ideal or normative good which is beyond 
actual or social "good-and-evil." Evil appears historically and socially as one of 
the possibilities opened up by the condition of finitude (good, i.e., historical 
good, is the other possibility opened up). Evil is made possible by (though not 
required by) the fact of human finitude understood as the relation of the created 
to the Creator. Just as there is the possibility of error in judgment (which can 
be morally neutral), so there is the possibility of "error" in moral and social 
action. But the dynamics of good and evil in the social world can be interpreted 
only by the standard of the "fullness of meaning," that is, the goodness of the 
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Creator. This does not establish, of course, the truth or correctness of the Christian 
theory, but it does present it as having a more internally coherent philosophy of 
history. 
Another point of difference is related to the Marxist concept of Utopia. The 
Utopian vision as the end-point of history is conceived by Marxists as the 
teleological motive for social change. Jameson observes that " ... a Marxist nega-
tive hermeneutic, a Marxist practice of ideological analysis proper, must in the 
practical work of reading and interpretation be exercised simultaneously with a 
Marxist positive hermeneutic, or a decipherment of the Utopian impulses of 
these same stilI ideological cultural texts" (192). Every cultural object or action 
has, Jameson says, both a negative and a positive function; each shows both the 
limitations of a particular ideology and the motive or impulse for a Utopian 
solution to social contradictions. This dual function is evident both empirically 
and theoretically, empirically as the dynamics of revolution and hope, theoreti-
cally as an explanation of the future direction of history. 
If we examine the concept of Utopia in the light of the principle of contradiction, 
however, we may raise a theoretical question. If contradiction is the necessary 
explanatory principle of social change and the basis for the dual function of 
cultural actions as revolution and hope, then how in the utopian society which 
Marxism envisions can there be change, since there would be no contradiction? 
Does not the Marxist utopia turn out to be not only a classless society but a 
static society? It is questionable, given our sense of social experience, let alone 
Marxist social theory itself, that a static society can even be imagined except as 
a conceptual paradigm. What would a society be like if there were no change? 
It is possible that the Marxist utopia could be conceived as a teleological goal 
without its being realizable within the actual historical process. But in that case 
Marxism would doom humanity to an endless process of class struggle in which 
there might be amelioration but never an escape from ideological oppression, 
and that at least seems to be a dimmer prospect than Marxists generally envision. 
It would seem necessary, in a Marxist view as Jameson represents it, to reconcile 
the apparently antagonistic concepts of utopia and contradiction. 
The Christian concept of the Eschaton, too, has always been depicted as the 
future realization of an ideal or utopian society. This "heavenly" society is, of 
course, commonly described in religious terms, but nevertheless it also makes 
possible a theoretically more coherent philosophy of history than does the Marxist 
conceptions of Utopia because it is not posited on the principle of contradiction 
as a condition for social change. The Christian heaven is not a static society, 
because the concepts of finitude and discovery create the possibility of historical 
change even in a society freed from "contradiction," that is, from social conflict, 
oppression, and evil. Although the Christian heaven is often stereotyped as a 
place where the saints listen to the endless droning of harps, it is more honestly 
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conceived as a society in which the discovery and exploration of life's possibilities 
will be unending, a society in which the possibility of new discoveries will never 
cease because the finite creature will never exhaust the infinite possibilities of 
experience and the endless discovery of meaning. Such a concept of utopia not 
only provides the necessary teleological principle for a philosophy of history but 
also contributes to a coherent theory of social change. 
Finally, we may examine Jameson's concept of the political unconscious itself. 
We will do so by way of some comments on the related concepts of Necessity 
and mode of production. Jameson speaks of history as "the experience of Neces-
sity"; Necessity is the "logic" of history because events are governed by the 
dialectic of social contradiction: "Necessity is here represented in the form of 
the inexorable logic involved in the determinate failure of all the revolutions that 
have taken place in human history" (102). The principle of Necessity cannot be 
regarded as ideological, because it is the logic of ideology itself, the historical 
principle which enables us to understand the development of social ideologies. 
Conceived in this way, the concept of Necessity is not "a type of content" (in 
which case it would be ideological) but rather "the inexorable form of events" 
(102). Just as binary opposition is the form which governs the content of texts, 
and just as mode of production is the forn} which governs social action, so 
Necessity is the form which governs the content of history. 
With this definition in mind we may ask how it is that we can specify mode 
of production as the decisive category for the analysis of social reality. It certainly 
is not a necessary category since at the empirical level particular modes of 
production are conceived as social realities, i.e., as content, and are therefore 
not required by the concept of Necessity as the "form of events." But Jameson 
also argues that mode of production is a conceptual category in structural or 
synchronic analyses and hence is a formal as well as a reified category. It is, as 
previously noted, the unifying structural category in terms of which all social 
structures and processes can be understood. Jameson's careful analysis of how 
the term mode of production is to be understood falls short, however, of 
demonstrating its necessity as a formal category. Whether mode of production 
is the best term for characterizing the manifestation of Necessity in the historical 
realities of social life is still an open question. 
A sceptical argument concerning the adequacy of the term mode of production 
could go in two directions. First, one could suggest that on empirical grounds 
the term is too heavily freighted with economic and political overtones to account 
for the intricacies of social life and the exercise of freedom. Marxists, of course, 
would disagree, since they claim empirical support for their theories. Neverthe-
less, the argument at this level still turns on empirical interpretation. 
A second line of argument is theoretical. If, as Jameson shows, the term mode 
of production becomes a category in the structural and synchronic analysis of 
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societies, it must be freed from its identification with the level of economic life 
which is part of social reality itself as its infrastructure. Mode of production, 
thus, is a formal category enabling the theorist to explain how the various levels 
of social activity are interrelated. But here a theoretical problem arises. If mode 
of production is a structural or formal category, it is neutral in its meaning until 
it receives semantic content from the empirical analysis of society. To illustrate 
by analogy, when we define the genre of epic in a certain way, our definition 
can function as a formal category which enables us to pick out and describe 
particular epics when we find them or when they are written. But the term epic, 
as a fonnal category or as the label of a genre is "empty" until it is defined, that 
is, given semantic content by means of the empirical study of certain kinds of 
texts. Similarly, the term mode of production is "empty" until it can be defined 
by means of empirical study. If this is the case, then we could for purposes of 
clarification suggest that the required unifying principle of structural analysis 
could be called the x-principle until we find a more appropriate term. What term 
we choose will depend on our empirical analysis and interpretation of social 
dynamics. And here one could conceivably argue that biological or ethical or 
linguistic or religious explanations are as cogent as economic or political ones. 
Hence, transporting the term mode of production from the empirical context of 
Marxist social analysis into the framework of Marxist structural analysis does 
not give the term additional theoretical cogency. Structural or formal categories 
are still subject to empirical testing and definition; they are not logically autonom-
ous. 
Now the same holds true for the concept of the political unconscious, perhaps 
even more so, for this concept is a purely formal or structural one since there 
is no "real" political unconscious as a part of social life. The political unconscious 
is in Jameson's use of the term the necessary formal and theoretical category 
required to unify this theory. But the semantic force of the concept is, as for all 
such concepts, dependent on the definition given to it on the basis of the theory 
as a whole, including both the empirical evidence for it and its theoretical 
plausibility. In short, although Jameson asserts that Necessity is the formal logic 
of the events of history, there is nothing necessary about his particular selection 
of the political unconscious as the final explanatory principle. It is true, of course, 
that there is nothing necessary about any choice of a final explanatory principle, 
but such being the case, Jameson seems a bit hasty in declaring his belief "that 
only Marxism offers a philosophically coherent and ideologically compelling 
resolution to the dilemma of historicism ... " (\9). 
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NOTES 
I. The Political Unconscious: Narrative as II Socially Symbolic Act, Ithaca, N. Y. (Cornell University 
Press), 1981. 
2. York (Columbia University Press), 1982. 
3. Jameson himself does not deal at length with this topic, but he does say this much: "Even in 
preclass society (what is called tribal or segmentary society, or in the Marxian tradition, primitive 
communism), collective consciousness is ... organized around the perception of what threatens the 
survival of the group ... " (290). Thus even the "originary" society cannot be conceived without the 
concept of contradiction even though the contradiction is not internal but between society and nature. 
This view does not escape the issue we are discussing, namely, the necessary priority of unity over 
contradiction in a philosophy of history. The Christian view on this point is that an original unity 
exists also in man's relation to the natural world. 
4. To argue that Marxism is an ideology, namely, the correct one, which arises at a certain stage 
of history, does not solve the problem because in this case we have not arrived "beyond good and 
evil"; rather. we have arrived at the point where Marxism is taken to be the right view and where 
the political unconscious becomes a code word for the good. 
